missile defense to counter weapons of mass destruction, project power and enhance interoperability with our allies. The air and missile threat landscape is changing drastically. No longer limited to tactical ballistic missiles, an increasing spectrum of threats such as rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) / Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and cruise missiles is proliferating. The Army will need to grow its AMD forces even though it is downsizing and there will be significant financial constraints in the near future regardless of sequestration. As the Army prepares its strategy from post-2014 Afghanistan, this paper will examine why ADA is one of the best enablers that directly supports the CSA's Guidance -Prevent, Shape, and Win, and will also play a key role as one of the Army's main efforts in rebalancing U.S. forces to the Pacific.
The Army Needs More Patriots
This paper is intended to serve as a threat warning for senior strategic leaders and decision makers. The U.S. supremacy against missile threats has been critically eroded due to the proliferation of technology. Air and missile threats are changing drastically. Meeting new threats posed by rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and cruise missiles (CM) from state and non-state actors constitute a serious threat to our national Air and Missile Defense (AMD) will become one of the most critical enablers needed to support more complex and sophisticated operating challenges. The Army needs to improve both the capability and capacity of its Air Defense Artillery (ADA) force structure to meet these new threats.
Emerging Combatant Commander (COCOM) Army AMD requirements must be addressed immediately in PACOM and EUCOM while also sustaining the current AMD strategy in CENTCOM. Increasing AMD capacity is a dilemma because the Army has 47% of its ADA force currently deployed for combat and operational missions worldwide. 2 The remainder of the force is either preparing to deploy or unavailable because they are entering the reset phase of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Further, AMD capability still needs to adapt to the changing threats while 2 simultaneously growing capacity. ADA force structure only makes up 1.3% of the Army force, which is as lean as it can get. 3 In the late 1990s, the Army leadership made the decision to remove ten Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) battalions from the U.S.
Army Divisions to pay other non-ADA force structure personnel bills. Now the Army lacks flexibility to crew new weapon systems, and does not possess a significant capability for defeating lower tier threats, especially cruise missiles.
Strategic Guidance and Threat Are Driving Army AMD Expansion
The Symposium in February 2013. 24 Further, the initial US response to the complex situation in Syria, which has strategic effects on its national security objectives, is not a Brigade 7
Combat Team but a Patriot unit. This is a recent example of how Army AMD units are best suited to execute the CSA's prevent/shape/win strategies.
The purpose of this deployment is NATO's response to the Turkish leadership's request for missile defense against threats from Syria. Overall, this mission demonstrates Army Air Defense's ability to support expeditionary operations and scalability to mitigate the threat within the context of prevention. 25 The Patriot unit was able to rapidly deploy minimum engagement packages via airlift from the Continental United States (CONUS) to meet the NATO timeline to establish operational capability to defeat a missile threat from Syria. More importantly, the unit was able to deploy and maintain a relatively small footprint with only 50% of its combat power and half of its demonstrates an equitable and shared approach from NATO and does not give the perception that it is a US centric mission. More importantly from an US interagency perspective, this is a comprehensive solution embraced by both DoD and the State Department. 26 In the end, the low number of troops and small footprint are effectively deterring a threat, and providing the international community more time to find a solution. However, if diplomatic efforts fail, precedence has demonstrated the Patriot missile system's proven ability to decisively win in combat because it is the best antiballistic missile system in the world. 30 Air Sea Battle (ASB) is a concept developed about three years ago that was initially an exclusive approach used by the US Air Force and US Navy to mitigate A2/AD challenges for joint forces. 31 However, land forces will play a crucial role in the execution of this concept, and the Army is now being integrated into the further development of this process. More importantly, Mr. Peter Bechtal, the Army's primary representative on the DoD Steering Group for ASB, states that it will be Army AMD forces that will provide "the first line of defense" for our strategic interests if the enemy is successful at denying the Navy and Air Force access to an area. 32 Forward deployed air and missile defense forces protecting airbases and allied territory can increase flexibility for the Navy's strategic mobility advantage and allows the Air Force to sustain combat power for offensive operations. 33 The senior ADA leadership recently commissioned a comprehensive study of the role of Army AMD in Joint Operational Access. 34 This four month study was represented by all services and led by a Navy-centric experienced team with extensive knowledge of integrated joint air and missile defense operations and ASB concepts. A common thread in the study's findings is that "[r]egardless of where operations take place in the AsiaPacific region, AMD forces would play key roles in defending U.S. interests." 35 However, the study highlighted immediate concerns that the ADA Branch and senior Army leadership will need to change to accomplish the strategic objectives of the ACC. Two of the most significant concerns are current AMD capability and limited AMD capacity for ground maneuver operations in the Pacific. 36 Over the last twenty years, Army ground forces have enjoyed unlimited freedom of maneuver from air threats due to air supremacy and air superiority. This will not be the case in the Pacific. China has learned from the U.S. successes in global force projection and invested significantly in A2/AD technology to limit this U.S. advantage over the past 15 years. 37 The Chinese have heavily invested in cruise missiles, UAS, and anti-radiation missiles (ARM) to exploit U.S. AMD capability gaps. The Army has not kept up the pace. For example, the Army terminated the SLAMRAAM 38 program which had the primary role of defeating cruise missiles. Another key program that is at risk is the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS), which has seen a system requirement drop from 16 to 2 orbits. 39 This sensor is crucial to the AMD modernization strategy that mitigates the capability gap for "a persistent, elevated and netted sensor" that provides 360 degree coverage. 40 JLENS already proved able to assist in the successful engagement of a cruise missile in April 2012. 41 Without these combined capabilities to defeat lower tier threats forces the "potential necessity of employing [Patriot] PAC-3 or PAC-2 missiles against these threats produc[ing] an unfavorable cost-exchange ratio that runs the risk of greatly accelerating depletion of missile inventories." 42 The Army also lacks in its ability to provide ADA coverage for tactical land forces, including an inability to be the most effective enabler for Brigade Combat Team (BCT) A2/AD ground maneuver missions in the Asia-Pacific region (and almost everywhere else for that matter). 43 The most recent U.S. Army National Training Center (NTC) observations during BCT Decisive Action rotations to Fort Irwin, California, highlight that the "Air Defense umbrella does not exist." 44 The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), TRADOC's proponent for developing the future BCT of 2020, acknowledges the same emerging threats of UAS and SAMs (which includes CMs) for the BCT. 45 There are only two SHORAD battalions in the Army active component inventory which highlights the lack of sufficient inventory to support any large-scale deployed force. For future AMD planning in the Asia-Pacific region, ADA's requirement to support operational maneuver elements will limit its flexibility due to the large dispersion of forces for an "already thinly spread AMD force." 46 ADA leadership started addressing the lack of capacity by developing a rotation plan to align National Guard SHORAD battalions to support BCTs. However, this relationship will take time to develop with each state involved in the plan.
12
The AMD capability and capacity concerns were validated during the recent TRADOC Unified Quest Winter Wargame Exercise which was conducted at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania from February 9-14, 2013. The participants were not only Army, but a combined, joint team of senior leaders from US and foreign services including academic leaders in the respective fields. This classified exercise was set in the year 2020 in the Asia-Pacific region focusing on early entry operations, specific security challenges, a failed state and weapons of mass destruction. 47 A key objective of the exercise was to focus on the Chairman's guidance from the CCJO: Joint Force 2020 to determine the 20% of the joint force that can still be changed to adapt to the future environment in the next 7 years. One of the participants stated that an area that ADA will need to develop for 2020 is an expeditionary AMD system that is highly mobile and can protect the maneuver force with the capability of CRAM, defeating cruise missiles, and performing counter unmanned aerial surveillance (C-UAS).
48

EUCOM Army AMD Demands Are Growing Beyond Current Capacity
As the Army shifts focus to prioritize the A2/AD challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, there is limited capacity for new missions within EUCOM. There is an expectation that these requirements will continue to increase based on the situation in Syria and the recently passed United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012, which will require the DoD to provide "additional articles and missile defense services" to Israel, specifically designating "missile defense capabilities" as part of the legislation.
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The The US Army's approach to NATO missile defense should also be nested with DoD's guidance in order to maintain credibility (Prevent) and build partner capacity (Shape). However, this is an area that needs improvement especially the force structure for the AAMDCs.
Current Army doctrine requires an AAMDC to support each COCOM. However, the Army is only able to man and equip four AAMDCs for five COCOMs and there is not a current sourcing solution to build a fifth AAMDC. 54 EUCOM and NATO at the operation/strategic level while executing TRA at the tactical level for AMD assets across three countries.
Recommendations
Clearly, the Army will have to change the way it trains, mans, organizes, and equips in order to adapt to the new missions it will be required to assume in the future. 57 The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance is a starting point for a culture change on how the Army needs to strategically think about the effectiveness of different enablers vice Brigade Combat Teams in terms of protecting our national interests.
In this regard, the time is right to re-look the Modular BCT force structure. The
Army is already addressing courses of action to reduce BCT force structure in order to meet the Army end-strength requirement of 490,000 Soldiers by fiscal year 2020. In January 2013, a major step in the future BCT force structure decision process was realized with the release of the Programmatic Environmental Assessment in January 2013. 58 While it is still at the HQDA decision point level, a true culture for change exists to make the ground force more capable is the best opportunity in the decision process to include the ADA force structure growth and with ADA's significant future contributions Another method to preserve force structure while improving capability is for the Army to "seek joint sponsorship for programs" that support mission requirements under the Joint Operational Access Concept. 63 The JLENS program would be ideal for this course of action. It has recently been approved to participate in a CONUS-based COCOM exercise in 2014 as part of the validation process. 64 Additionally, with the recent deployment of a coalition Patriot task force to Turkey in support of the NATO alliance, this would be the perfect opportunity to accelerate the fielding timeline for JLENS after having already proving its mettle, and validating it in a joint operational environment.
Another potential joint sponsorship program would be the Israeli Iron Dome system. On 20 March 2013, the US committed an additional $250 million to improve the weapon system. 65 This Iron Dome could be a short term answer for defeating rockets and artillery from fixed locations, especially for South Korea airbases where Army AMD systems are already co-located. Another advantage to this system is that it only requires five personnel to man it. However, joint sponsorship would be needed to integrate it into AMD sensors/mission command elements for the Army and US Navy (USN). The USN is also looking at Iron Dome as a self defense weapon for Aegis
Cruisers, but will need to determine best how to integrate it with other systems because it is currently a stand-alone system. 66 With all of the effort focusing on increasing capacity and improving Army AMD capability, the same energy also needs to be applied on the assignment of officers to key joint and visible Army positions coded for Air Defense officers. Talent management will be crucial to ensure the best officer with the right experience is assigned to these Another issue impacting the ADA officer corps is the lack of 'hands-on' AMD experience for short range air defense (SHORAD) at the ADAM Cell within the BCT and 
Conclusion
It is clear that more ADA forces will be needed to meet all regional combatant commander requirements, counter future threats, and directly support the Army's rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. However, it will be difficult to realize force structure growth in a zero sum environment. With the Army drawing down at least 75,000 Soldiers in the next 8 years, there is no easy solution to find force structure savings, especially with an Army priority to increase organic capability and capacity for the BCT, meaning for the moment devoting ever more personnel to that process.
However, if the Army remains committed to executing the intent of the ACC, it is the right decision to increase AMD forces while inactivating other Army organizations. An AMD increase will immediately and ultimately help us defend our national security interests in a decisive manner.
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